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The	  ‘Death	  of	  Deviance’	  and	  Stagnation	  of	  Twentieth	  Century	  Criminology	  
Mark	  Horsley	  The	  publication	  of	  Colin	  Sumner’s	  (1994)	  The	  Sociology	  of	  Deviance:	  An	  Obituary	  marked	  a	  critical	  transformation	  in	  the	  theorisation	  of	  crime	  and	  criminality.	  In	  a	  work	  that	  offered	  a	  narrative	  history	  of	  criminological	   theory	   from	  Durkheim’s	  (1982	   [1895])	   Sociological	   Method	   to	   Taylor	   et	   al’s	   	   (2003	   [1973])	   The	   New	  
Criminology,	  Sumner	  explored	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  early	  sociological	  explanations	  for	  criminality,	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  perspective	  and	  a	  radical	  transformation	  of	  the	  discipline	  during	  the	  middle	  decades	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  The	  original	  ‘sociology	  of	  deviance’	  –	  the	  book’s	   initial	  object	  of	  study	  –	  emerged	  during	  the	  1920s	  as	  an	  early	  attempt	  to	  offer	  a	  sociological	  theory	  of	  criminal	  causation.	  Its	  reliance	   on	   a	   normative	   perspective,	   however,	   left	   little	   room	   for	   the	   putative	  plurality	  of	   social	  norms	   in	   light	  of	   the	   counter-­‐cultural	   ideals	  of	   the	  nineteen-­‐sixties.	   In	   these	   circumstances	   Sumner	   goes	   on	   to	   identify	   an	   increasingly	  forceful	   pluralist	   critique	   that	   placed	   greater	   emphasis	   on	   the	   potential	  illegitimacy	   of	   normative	   prohibitions,	   the	   censorious	   nature	   of	   centralised	  power	  and	  hysterical	   social	   reactions	   to	   the	  perceived	  deviance	  of	   subordinate	  groups.	  In	   Sumner’s	   estimation	   this	   social	   reaction	   perspective	   became	   increasingly	  symptomatic	  of	  criminological	  theory	  during	  the	  latter	  decades	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   the	   discipline	   looked	   to	   be	   undergoing	   a	   marked	  paradigm	  shift	  leaving	  behind	  many	  of	  its	  founding	  concepts	  for	  a	  more	  ‘mature’,	  ‘enlightened’	   interpretation	   of	   its	   subject	   matter.	   While	   noting	   that	   the	   old	  ‘sociology	  of	  deviance’	  seemed	  to	  be	  running	  out	  of	  steam,	  variously	  describing	  it	  as	   ‘outmoded’,	   ‘stagnant’	   or	   'stalled’	   and	   even	   likening	   it	   to	   the	   terrain	   of	   a	  battlefield	   –	   empty,	   scarred,	   deathly	   silent	   –	   the	   emerging	   social	   reaction	  perspective	  attracted	   far	  more	  affirmative	  discussion.	   In	  Sumner’s	   (2012:	  165)	  analysis,	   “the	   concept	   of	   social	   censure	   has	   considerably	  more	   descriptive	   and	  explanatory	  power,	   is	   research	   generative	   and	   can	  be	  deployed	   irrespective	   of	  politics”.	   In	  this	  way,	  Sumner’s	  narrative,	  while	  not	  uncritical	  of	   the	  developing	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perspective,	   effectively	   captured	   the	   criminological	   zeitgeist	   providing	   a	   key	  statement	  of	  how	  the	  discipline	  saw	  itself	  during	  the	  decades	  running	  up	  to	  the	  new	  millennium,	  finding	  a	  deeply	  appreciative	  audience	  and	  a	  ready-­‐made	  home	  amid	  the	  wider	  criminological	  literature	  (see,	  O’Connell,	  1995;	  Venkatesh,	  1995;	  Roberts,	  1996,	  for	  typical	  assessments).	  	  	  In	   this	  way	  an	  emerging	   'sociology	  of	  censure'	  arguably	  altered	   the	  discipline’s	  surface	   texture,	   repurposed	   criminological	   theory	   and	   even	   realigned	   the	  ultimate	   aims	   of	   criminological	   analysis	   to	   focus	   more	   on	   media	   discourse,	  political	  portrayal	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  representation.	  In	  this	  chapter	  we	  will	  look	  back	   on	   the	   resultant	   intellectual	   transformation	   from	   a	   twenty-­‐first	   century	  perspective	   in	   order	   to	   critically	   explore	   its	   long-­‐term	   impact.	   	  We	  will	   divide	  this	  discussion	  into	  three	  component	  parts.	  The	  first	  will	  put	  a	   little	  more	  flesh	  on	  Sumner’s	  observed	  transformation	  in	  order	  to	  fully	  appreciate	  the	  ideas	  and	  concepts	   that	   define	   both	   the	   ‘sociology	   of	   deviance’	   and	   the	   subsequent	  ‘sociology	   of	   censure’.	  We	  will	   then	   look	   again	   at	   social	   censure’s	   explanatory	  capacity	  based	  on	  a	  growing	   critique	   its	  political,	   philosophical	   and	   ideological	  roots	  (see,	  for	  instance,	  Hall	  et	  al,	  2008;	  Hall,	  2012).	  The	  final	  third	  will	  consider	  the	  possibility	   that	  criminology	   is	  currently	  returning	  to	  some	  of	   the	   ideas	  that	  once	   characterised	   the	   ‘sociology	   of	   deviance’	   with	   particular	   reference	   to	  growing	  interest	  in	  the	  socio-­‐cultural	  forces	  behind	  criminality.	  	  
	  
From	  ‘Deviance’	  to	  ‘Censure’	  The	   ‘sociology	   of	   deviance’	   grew	   out	   of	   Durkheimian	   social	   theory	   and	   its	  attempts	  to	  establish	  a	  ‘realist’	  social	  science	  that	  would	  locate	  social	  interaction	  within	   a	   broader	   cultural,	   political	   and	   economic	   context.	   Its	   purpose	   was	   to	  move	   beyond	   the	   ‘methodological	   individualism’	   that	   marked	   nineteenth-­‐century	   positivism’s	   theorisation	   of	   crime	   and	   deviance	   to	   offer	   a	   holistic	  analysis	  of	  relationships	  between	  social	  context	  and	   individual	  action	  based	  on	  empirical	   observation	   of	   the	   social	  world.	  Where	  most	   pre-­‐existing	   theoretical	  frameworks	   held	   ‘social	   facts’	   such	   as	   crime	   to	   be	   artefacts	   of	   individual	  pathology,	  Durkheimian	  sociology	  began	   to	  recognise	   the	   ineffable	  contingency	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of	  social	  action.	  In	  other	  words,	  Durkheim	  began	  to	  offer	  explanations	  for	  social	  phenomena	   grounded	   in	   practical	   and	   philosophical	   context,	   promoting	   a	  “phenomenological	   perspective…	   which	   challenged	   the	   crude	   [individualist]	  empiricism	   of	   the	   positivist	   vision,	   and	   offered	   new	   images	   of	   the	   thoroughly	  social	  character	  of	  vision…	  [making]	   it	  altogether	  more	  difficult	   to	  separate	  the	  phenomenon	   allegedly	   observed	   from	   the	   emotional,	   political,	   linguistic	   and	  cultural	  conditions	  of	  the	  observation”	  (Sumner,	  1994:	  10).	  	  	  While	   there	   is	   much	   more	   to	   be	   said	   about	   the	   complexities	   of	   Durkheimian	  sociology	  the	  assertion	  that	  social	   interaction	   is	  driven	  by	  much	  more	  than	  the	  internal	  nature	  of	  the	  individual	  was	  quite	  a	  radical	  idea	  for	  the	  early	  part	  of	  the	  twentieth	   century.	   It	   held	   that	   the	   social	  world	  was	   a	   product	   of	   socio-­‐ethical	  ideals,	  practical	  circumstances	  and	  the	   interplay	  between	  people,	  organisations	  and	   collective	   moral	   sentiments	   rather	   than	   the	   clash	   of	   isolated	   individuals,	  some	  of	  whom	  with	  singular	  pathological	  defects.	  	  This	  basic	  idea	  appeared	  in	  a	  few	  different	  guises	  throughout	  Durkheim’s	  work	  but	  perhaps	  most	  instructively	  in	  his	  assertion	  that	  increasingly	  complex	  modern	  societies	  were	  losing	  many	  of	  their	  old	  moral	   certainties	   amid	   the	   creeping	  decline	  of	  organised	   religion	  and	  the	   rise	   of	   an	   industrial	   economy	   that	   severed	   individual	   attachments	   to	  instructive	  moral	   sentiments.	  Where	  western	   society	   perhaps	   seemed	   to	   have	  come	  from	  a	  single	  moral	  order,	  Durkheim	  (2002	  [1897])	  noted	  that	  the	  growing	  complexity	  of	  social	  relations	  seemed	  to	   isolate	   individuals	   from	  the	  normative	  values	   that	   structured	   interaction	   heralding	   a	   condition	   of	   normlessness	   that	  turned	   pre-­‐existing	   social	   dispositions	   toward	   self-­‐preservation	   –	   greed,	  interpersonal	   competition	   and	   material	   acquisition	   –	   resulting	   in	   growing	  deviation	   from	   established	   norms	   amongst	   those	   worst	   affected	   by	   the	   rapid	  pace	  of	  social	  change	  in	  industrialising	  societies.	  The	   Chicago	   School	   of	   Sociology	   started	   out	  with	   the	   assertion	   that	   crime	   and	  deviance	   needed	   to	   be	   treated	   as	   concrete	   aspects	   of	   social	   reality	   rooted	   in	  contingent	  circumstance	  rather	  than	  the	  base	  nature	  of	  the	  individual.	  With	  this	  in	  mind	   they	   set	   out	   to	   explore	   the	   significant	   context	   of	   deviance	   and	  quickly	  noticed	  that	  all	  manner	  of	  social	  problems,	  including	  criminality,	  seemed	  to	  map	  disproportionately	   onto	   run	   down	   inner	   city	   areas	   primarily	   inhabited	   by	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disadvantaged	  groups.	  It	  quickly	  started	  to	  look	  as	  if	  there	  must	  be	  a	  connection	  between	  the	  two,	  as	  if	  ‘disorganised’	  circumstances	  lead	  into	  increased	  deviance	  from	  pre-­‐existing	  social	  norms,	   including	  acquisitive	  and	  violent	   criminality.	   In	  this	  way,	  much	  of	   the	  Chicago	  School’s	   theoretical	  approach,	  heavily	   influenced	  by	   Durkheim,	   shows	   more	   than	   a	   passing	   concern	   for	   the	   possibility	   that	  deleterious	   social	   circumstances,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   their	   effect	   on	   moral	   life,	  effectively	  pushed	  those	  in	  dire	  straits	  to	  otherwise	  alien	  forms	  of	  social	  action.	  Within	   this	   theoretical	   framework	   we	   find	   the	   foundations	   of	   social	  disorganisation	   theory	   (Shaw	   &	   McKay,	   1972	   [1942]),	   Sutherland’s	   (1992	  [1924])	  differential	   association	   and	  Mertonian	   (1938)	   strain	   all	   of	  which	   came	  out	   of	   a	   tacitly	   Durkheimian	   concern	   for	   collective	   morality,	   the	   cultural	  pressures	  of	  industrial/consumer	  society	  and	  their	  deviant	  implications.	   	  In	  the	  latter	   case,	   for	   example,	   Robert	   Merton	   specifically	   argued	   that	   people	  confronted	  by	  the	  inability	  to	  live	  up	  to	  social	  goals	  within	  a	  materialistic	  culture	  potentially	   adapt	   to	   the	   resultant	   sense	   of	   inadequacy	   by	   dropping	   any	  remaining	   allegiance	   to	   prohibitive	   moral	   norms	   in	   favour	   of	   more	   forceful	  competition	  for	  wealth	  and	  status.	  	  In	  other	  words,	   the	   ‘sociology	  of	  deviance’	  was	  primarily	   interested	   in	  criminal	  motivation,	   in	   the	   forces	   that	   drive	   people	   into	   the	   acquisitive,	   combative	   and	  often	  violent	  behaviours	  that	  generally	  constitute	  criminality.	  It	  may	  well	  be	  the	  case	   that	   none	   of	   the	   Chicago	   School’s	   ideas,	   nor,	   for	   that	   matter,	   any	   of	   the	  theories	   that	   followed	   in	   their	  wake,	  provide	  an	  entirely	  persuasive	  account	  of	  motivating	  cultural	  forces	  but	  as	  foundations	  on	  which	  to	  build	  they	  collectively	  represent	   an	   interesting	   and	   engaging	   attempt	   to	   explore	   a	   vital	   aspect	   of	  criminology.	  The	  sociology	  of	  deviance	  was	  a	  distinct	  and	  purposeful	  attempt	  to	  grapple	   with	   the	   fundamental	   problem	   of	   criminal	   causation,	   or,	   as	   recently	  phrased,	  to	  explain,	  “why	  individuals	  or	  corporate	  bodies	  are	  willing	  to	  risk	  the	  infliction	   of	   harm	   on	   others	   in	   order	   to	   further	   their	   own	   instrumental	   or	  expressive	  interests”	  (Hall,	  2012:	  1).	  Most	  importantly,	  however,	  Sumner	  (1994)	  notes	  that	  the	  ‘sociology	  of	  deviance’	  was	  bound	  up	  with	  the	  radical	  change	  of	  direction	  in	  western	  politics	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  European	  social	  democracy	  and	  the	  American	  ‘New	  Deal’.	  The	  privations	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of	  the	  Great	  Depression,	  not	  to	  mention	  two	  world	  wars,	  soured	  western	  cultural	  relationships	  with	  nineteenth	  century	  laissez	  faire,	  leading	  British	  and	  American	  populations	   to	   demand	   major	   improvements	   in	   their	   social	   circumstances	  through	   new	   institutions	   and	   egalitarian	   policy	   change	   (see	   Galbraith,	   1994;	  Freiden,	  2006).	  	  The	  sociology	  of	  deviance	  became	  entwined	  with	  the	  resulting	  political	  project	  as	  the	  empirical	  elaboration	  of	  the	  social	  world	  allowed	  for	  clearer	  identification	  of	  problems	   and	   more	   purposeful	   formulation	   of	   corrective	   policy.	   Its	  understanding	  of	  social	   ills	  and	  their	  apparent	  relationship	  with	  industrialism’s	  rapid	   pace	   of	   social	   change	   naturally	   flowed	   into	   welfare	   programmes,	   job	  creation	   schemes	   and	   new	   social	   institutions	   that	   dramatically	   improved	  everyday	   life	   (see	   Hutton,	   1996;	   2003)	   while	   working	   against	   the	   forces	   that	  notionally	   pushed	   people	   into	   criminality.	   In	   the	   hands	   of	   administrators	   and	  political	   pragmatists,	   however,	   the	   sociology	   of	   deviance,	   even	   within	   its	  apparently	  Durkheimian	  perspective,	  quickly	  returned	  to	  much	  older	  concepts	  of	  individual	  pathology	  and	  personal	   failing.	  The	  conceptual	  advances	  of	   the	  early	  twentieth	   century	   reverted	   to	   “casual	   condescension	   and	   mindless	   jargon	  justifying	   full	   intervention	   in	   the	   lives	   of	   the	   powerless	   and	   poor…	   theoretical	  advances	   became	   mere	   subliminal	   references	   and	   the	   old	   concepts	   and	  prejudices	   openly	   structured	   the	   surface	   text”	   (Sumner,	   1994:	   130-­‐31).	   The	  sociology	   of	   deviance,	   it	   seemed,	   simply	   provided	   a	   veneer	   of	   intellectual	  respectability	  for	  those	  with	  a	  political	  interest	  in	  castigating	  the	  disadvantaged	  and	  justifying	  authoritarian	  intervention	  in	  their	  lives.	  	  Where	   the	   sociology	   of	   deviance	   concerned	   itself	   with	   social	   ills	   and	   their	  causative	   impact	   on	   criminality,	   the	   decline	   of	   those	   problems	   coupled	  with	   a	  seemingly	   inexorable	   rise	   in	   recorded	   crime	   in	   step	   with	   an	   increasingly	  authoritarian	  response	  all	  but	  forced	  a	  change	  of	  perspective.	  If	  criminality	  was	  not	   simply	   the	   product	   of	   social	   ills	   –	   an	   observation	   amply	   demonstrated	   by	  rising	  crime	  amid	  vaguely	  egalitarian	  social	  policy	  and	  massive	  improvements	  in	  social	   conditions	  on	  both	  sides	  of	   the	  Atlantic	   (Reiner,	  2007)	  –	   its	   causation,	   it	  seemed,	  must	   lie	  elsewhere,	  perhaps	  even	   in	   the	  social	  democratic	   intrusion	  of	  the	  state	  into	  everyday	  life.	  With	  this	  possibility	  ringing	  in	  their	  ears	  the	  sixties	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generation	  of	  social	  theorists	  internalised	  the	  growing	  philosophical	  rejection	  of	  centralised	  power	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  contemporary	  politics	  (Frank,	  1999)	  moulding	  it	   into	   the	   criminological	   observation	   that	   the	   state’s	   efforts	   to	  maintain	   social	  control	   exacerbated	   the	   ‘crime	   problem’	   through	   constant	   expansion	   of	   the	  criminal	   law	   and	   the	   effects	   of	   getting	  wound	   up	  with	   justice	   systems.	   In	   line	  with	  a	  broad	  labelling	  perspective	  adapted	  from	  the	  sociological	  work	  of	  Erving	  Goffman	   (1963)	   and	   Edwin	   Lemert	   (1972)	   criminology	   started	   to	   concentrate	  more	   on	   how	   the	   power	   to	   create	   laws	   and	   apply	   their	   associated	   censures	  effectively	   generates	   ‘crime’	   and	   ‘deviance’	  where	   before	   there	  may	   only	   have	  been	  neutral	  social	  action.	  In	  Becker’s	  (1963:	  9)	  often	  repeated	  terms,	  	  	  social	   groups	   create	   deviance	   by	  making	   the	   rules	  whose	   infraction	  constitutes	  deviance,	  and	  by	  applying	  those	  rules	  to	  particular	  people	  and	  labelling	  them	  outsiders.	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view	  deviance	  is	  not	  a	  quality	   of	   the	   act…	   but	   rather	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   application	   by	  others	  of	  rules	  and	  sanctions	  to	  an	  ‘offender’.	  	  In	   other	   words,	   the	   discipline	   turned	   its	   attention	   to	   the	   ‘deviance	   of	   the	  lawmakers’,	   the	   ‘censorious’	   advancement	   of	   social	   control	   over	   individual	  freedom,	   the	  power	  of	  definition	  vested	   in	  political	   institutions	  and	   the	   role	  of	  public	  discourse	  in	  criminal	  justice.	  What	  we	  have	  in	  the	  work	  of	  early	  labelling	  theorists	   is	   the	  beginning	  of	   a	   paradigm	   shift	   in	   criminological	   theory,	   a	   set	   of	  ideas	   that	   have	   come	   to	   dominate	   the	   discipline	   over	   the	   next	   few	   decades	   at	  least	  partially	  eclipsing	  the	  concept	  of	  crime	  as	  normative	  transgression	  leading	  to	  the	  assertion	  that	  this	  latter	  disposition	  was	  all	  but	  dead,	  the	  core	  assertion	  of	  Sumner’s	  (1994)	  obituary.	  	  
	  
After	  the	  ‘Death	  of	  Deviance’	  The	   ‘sociology	  of	  censure’	  entered	  criminology	  during	  the	  nineteen-­‐sixties	  with	  symbolic	   interactionism’s	   adaptation	   of	   American	   phenomenology	   and	   the	  assertion	  that	  the	  societal	  reaction	  to	  perceived	  deviance	  was	  perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  driving	  the	  escalation	  of	  recorded	  crime	  rates	  on	  both	  sides	  of	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the	   Atlantic.	   In	   this	   original	   form	   what	   became	   labelling	   theory	   argued	   that	  minor	   lifestyle	   differences	   only	   become	   the	   first	   movements	   of	   sustained	  deviance	   by	   provoking	  wider	   society	   into	   an	   excessive	   crackdown	   on	   youthful	  hijinks.	   The	   application	   of	   a	   deviant	   ‘label’	   then	   forces	   affected	   individuals	   to	  construct	  social	  identity	  amid	  ongoing	  records	  of	  past	  misdeeds	  that	  colour	  their	  social	  relationships,	  erode	  legitimate	  opportunities	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  ensure	  their	  allegiance	   to	   deviant	   lifestyles.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   label	   effectively	   ‘spoils’	  (Goffman,	   1963)	   individual	   identity	   creating	   a	   self-­‐fulfilling	   prophecy	   in	  which	  society’s	   attempts	   to	   buttress	   social	   norms	   exacerbate	   deviancy,	   increase	   the	  profile	  of	  social	  problems	  and	  generate	  public	  demand	  for	  a	  punitive	  response.	  	  If	   we	   jump	   forward	   into	   the	   nineteen-­‐seventies	   we	   find	   these	   ideas	   rapidly	  assuming	  the	  mantle	  of	  dominant	  paradigm.	  In	  his	  well-­‐known	  study	  of	  London	  drug	   culture,	   for	   example,	   Jock	   Young	   (1971)	   argued	   that	   society’s	   punitive	  reaction	   tied	   his	   research	   subjects	   into	   their	   drug-­‐taking	   identity,	   amplifying	  initially	   insignificant	   levels	   of	   deviance	   by	   raising	   the	   public	   profile	   of	   their	  offences.	  Much	  the	  same	  narrative	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  Cohen’s	  (2002	  [1973])	  work	  on	  British	  ‘subcultures’	  in	  which	  he	  argued	  that	  efforts	  to	  maintain	  social	  norms	  and	   regulate	   interpersonal	   conduct	   reinforce	   potentially	   criminal	   deviancy	   by	  further	   alienating	   offenders	   from	   mainstream	   social	   norms,	   driving	   their	  deviancy	   to	   new	   heights	   and	   generating	   demand	   for	   an	   even	   more	   punitive	  response.	  These	  ideas,	  however,	  really	  came	  to	  a	  head	  with	  critical	  criminology	  and	   its	   attempts	   to	   locate	   both	   crime	   and	   criminal	   justice	   discourse	   within	  inalienable	  class	  conflict.	  In	  Hall’s	  (2012:	  109)	  terms:	  	  
Generally,	   there	   are	   three	   major	   themes	   to	   critical	   criminology:	   1)	  criminologists	  should	  focus	  on	  why	  some	  people	  and	  not	  others	  are	  labelled	  as	  criminals	  rather	  than…	  the	  characteristics	  that	  distinguish	  criminals	  from	  non-­‐criminals;	  2)	  moral	  panics	  about	  street	  crime	  are	  engineered	  to	  justify	  harsh	  and	  authoritarian	   laws;	  3)	   the	   criminal	   justice	   system	   is	   a	   tool	  used	  for	   the	  maintenance	  of	   the	   status	  quo	   and	   serves	   the	   interests	   only	  of	   the	  powerful	  members	  of	  society.	  Taylor	   et	   al	   (1973),	   for	   instance,	   asserted	   that	   criminal	   justice	   places	   undue	  emphasis	   on	   the	   ‘crimes	   of	   the	   powerless’	   whilst	   the	   far	   more	   troublesome	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transgressions	   of	   the	   relatively	   powerful	   classes	   often	   pass	   without	   comment	  because	  justice	  itself	  is	  an	  artefact	  of	  class	  power.	  What’s	  more,	  they	  argued,	  the	  fundamental	   conflicts	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   Marxist	   philosophy	   meant	   that	   that	   all	  manner	  of	  ‘deviants’,	  through	  their	  rejection	  of	  biased	  social	  norms,	  constituted	  a	  proto-­‐revolutionary	  vanguard	  whose	  ‘creative	  resistance’	  to	  mainstream	  society	  engendered	   wholly	   disproportionate	   criminalisation	   and	   reactionary	   social	  control.	  With	   this	   in	  mind	  the	  business	  of	  criminological	   theory	  was	   to	  redress	  the	  balance;	   to	  portray	   ‘criminals’	  as	  potential	   folk	  heroes	  rather	   than	   the	   ‘folk	  devils’	   they	   were	   made	   out	   to	   be	   by	   authoritarian	   powers.	   What	   mainstream	  society	   successfully	   portrayed	   as	   disintegrative,	   harmful	   forms	   of	   social	  interaction	   inimical	   to	   social	   order	   were,	   for	   the	   new	   criminologists,	   actually	  reassertions	   of	   human	   freedom	   amid	   the	   overbearing	   oppression	   of	   social	  democratic	  –	  in	  America	  read	  ‘New	  Deal’	  –	  bureaucracy.	  In	  their	  terms,	  “for	  us…	  
deviance	  is	  normal	  –	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  men	  are	  now	  consciously	  involved	  (in	  the	  prisons	  that	  are	  contemporary	  society	  and	  in	  the	  real	  prisons)	  in	  asserting	  their	  human	   diversity…	   The	   task	   is	   to	   create	   a	   society	   in	  which	   the	   facts	   of	   human	  diversity,	  whether	   personal,	   organic	   or	   social,	   are	   not	   subject	   to	   the	   power	   to	  criminalise”	  (Ibid.	  282).	  	  	  In	   this	   way	   criminological	   theory	   benefited	   from	   a	   notable	   paradigm	   shift	   in	  which	   social	   reaction	   theory,	   labelling,	   criminalisation	   and	   moral	   panics	  repurposed	   the	   discipline,	   turning	   it	   away	   from	   underlying	   socio-­‐cultural	  motivations	  toward	  the	  castigation	  of	  ‘authoritarian’	  state	  power,	  social	  control,	  media	   discourse	   and	   inequalities	   of	   representation.	   Furthermore,	   these	   ideas	  remain	   a	   substantial	   force	   within	   twenty-­‐first	   century	   criminology.	   Cohen’s	  (2002	   [1972])	   take	  on	  moral	  panics,	   for	  example,	   seems	   to	  have	   found	   its	  way	  into	  the	  common	  lexicon	  as	  an	  abstract	  but	  apparently	  naturalistic	  description	  of	  social	   life	   that	   is	   constantly	   recycled	   with	   every	   new	   turn	   in	   criminal	   justice	  discourse.	  Whether	  it’s	  child	  abduction	  and	  paedophilia	  (Cavanagh,	  2007;	  Marsh	  &	   Melville,	   2011),	   white-­‐collar	   crime	   (Levi,	   2009)	   or	   9/11	   and	   the	   threat	   of	  terrorism	   (Rothe	   &	   Muzzatti,	   2004)	   someone	   takes	   the	   opportunity	   of	   a	  publication	   in	   which,	   no	   matter	   the	   subject,	   it’s	   all	   just	   an	   issue	   of	   over-­‐representation.	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The	   same	   emphasis	   on	   social	   reaction	   also	   finds	   its	   way	   into	   ‘cultural	  criminology’,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  significant	  development	  of	  the	  nineteen-­‐nineties,	  which	   “references	   the	   increasing	   analytical	   attention	   that	  many	   criminologists	  now	   give	   to	   popular	   culture	   constructions,	   and	   especially	   mass	   media	  constructions,	  of	  crime	  and	  crime	  control”	   (Ferrell,	  1999:	  395).	   In	   fact,	  cultural	  criminology	  continually	  draws	  on	  the	  labelling	  and	  critical	  criminology	  tradition	  to	  construct	  a	  narrative	  of	  political	  opposition	  around	  low-­‐level	  criminality	  and	  frequently	   claims	   to	   have	   uncovered	   forms	   of	   ‘creative	   resistance’	   to	  authoritarian	   governance	   (see,	   for	   instance,	   Presdee,	   2000).	   Many	   of	   cultural	  criminology’s	  research	  conclusions	  follow	  a	  pattern	  that	  has	  not	  changed	  all	  that	  much	  in	  the	  last	  forty	  years	  running	  from	  the	  observation	  of	  low-­‐level	  deviance,	  through	   public	   reaction	   to	   amplification.	   Ferrell	   et	   al’s	   (2011:	   17)	   recent	  invitation	  to	  broader	  ‘cultural’	  analysis	  of	  criminal	  justice	  discourse,	  for	  instance,	  summarises	  some	  their	  recent	  work	  on	  ‘crime	  and	  resistance’:	  	  	  
When	   gentrification	   and	   ‘urban	   redevelopment’	   drive	   late	   capitalist	   urban	  economies,	   when	   urban	   public	   spaces	   are	   increasingly	   converted	   to	  privatized	   consumption	   zones,	   graffiti	   comes	   under	   particular	   attack	   by	  legal	   and	   economic	   authorities	   as	   an	   aesthetic	   threat	   to	   cities’	   economic	  vitality.	   In	   such	  a	   context	   legal	  authorities	  aggressively	   criminalize	  graffiti,	  corporate	  media	   campaigns	   construct	   graffiti	   writers	   as	   violent	   vandals	   –	  and	   graffiti	   writers	   themselves	   become	  more	   organized	   and	   politicized	   in	  response.	  In	   this	   vein,	   the	   social	   reaction	   perspective	   has	   contributed	   much	   to	   the	  continued	  development	   of	   criminological	   theory	   both	   of	  which	   have	   singularly	  benefited	   from	   a	   variety	   of	   new	   ideas	   each	   of	  which	   associated	  with	   a	   critical	  perspective	  on	   the	  effects	  of	  official	  discourse.	  We	  might	  point,	   for	  example,	   to	  the	  role	  of	  politicians	  and	  corporate	  media	  in	  stoking	  up	  public	  fears,	  the	  reasons	  why	   some	   harmful	   acts	   and	   not	   others	   attract	   criminal	   prohibition	   and	   the	  political	   function	   of	   a	   ‘culture	   of	   fear’	   in	   legitimising	   the	   sort	   of	   authoritarian	  governance	  that	  threatens	  to	  erode	  civil	  liberties.	  	  If	  we	  return	  our	  analysis	  to	  the	  philosophical	  context,	  however,	  we	  might	  suggest	  that	  the	  ‘sociology	  of	  censure’	  was	  also	  rooted	  in	  political	  philosophy.	  Where	  it	  is	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only	   slightly	   simplistic	   to	   say	   that	   post-­‐war	   society	   invested	   in	   bureaucratic	  regulation	  for	  the	  betterment	  of	  social	  conditions,	  the	  dominant	  political	  ideals	  of	  the	  nineteen-­‐sixties	  and	  seventies	   identified	   the	   same	  regulation	  as	   the	   root	  of	  socio-­‐economic	   stagnation	   along	   with	   a	   consequent	   need	   to	   reassert	   “every	  person’s	   claim	   to	   maximized	   private	   freedom…	   the	   unrestrained	   liberty	   to	  express	   autonomous	  desires	   and	  have	   them	   respected	   and	   institutionalised	  by	  society	  at	  large”	  (Judt,	  2010:	  87).	  It	  rejected	  “any	  form	  of	  determination	  liable	  to	  restrict	   the	   self-­‐definition	   and	   self-­‐fulfilment	   of	   individuals”	   (Boltanski	   and	  Chiapello,	   2005:	   433)	   and	   associated	   the	   expansion	   of	   social	   regulation	   with	  anything	  perceived	  to	  be	  wrong	  with	  that	  system	  of	  governance.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  mainstream	  political	  philosophy	  came	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  sanctity	  of	  the	   individual,	   the	   moral	   correctness	   of	   radical	   self-­‐determination	   and,	  conversely,	   the	   illegitimacy	   of	   social	   expectation,	   restrictive	   norms	   and	   other	  constraints	   on	   ‘freedom	   of	   choice’.	   The	   idea	   that	   ‘the	   state’	   excessively	  constrained	   individual	   freedom	   came	   to	   typify	   cultural	   discourse	   during	   the	  latter	  decades	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  as	  various	  different	  groups	  claimed	  that	  one	   or	   another	   social	   norm	   prevented	   them	   from	   fully	   expressing	   their	  individuality,	   ‘letting	   it	   all	  hang	  out’	   and	  generally	   ‘being	   themselves’.	  The	  new	  political	   and	   cultural	   paradigm	  preached	   the	   separation	   of	   the	   individual	   from	  collective	  authority,	   the	  ethical	   sanctity	  of	   self-­‐determination	  and	   the	  necessity	  of	   ‘tolerance’	   all	   of	  which	   quickly	   ascended	   to	   the	   status	   of	   dominant	   ideology	  (see	   Frank,	   1999;	   Hedges,	   2011)	   becoming	   incredibly	   forceful	   in	   both	   the	  cultural	  and	  economic	   fields	  of	  social	  activity.	  Where	  some	  adopted	   the	   idea	  of	  individual	   liberty	   to	  call	   for	   increased	  cultural	   freedom,	  emancipation	   from	  the	  monotony	  of	  work	  and	  greater	   flexibility	   in	  social	   life,	  others	  claimed	  the	  same	  rejection	  of	  centralised	  power	  for	  their	  attempts	  to	  roll	  back	  economic	  oversight,	  liberate	   the	   finance	   industry	  and	  bring	   the	   state	   into	   line	  with	   the	  demands	  of	  continued	  capital	  accumulation	  (Galbraith,	  2008).	  	  	  	  	  When	   these	   ideas	   filtered	   into	   criminological	   theory	   they	   turned	   the	  discipline	  toward	   a	   detailed	   study	   of	   the	   application	   of	   stigma	   and	   the	   possibility	   that	  ‘deviant’	   labels	   effectively	   push	  people	   into	   criminality	   as	   they	   try	   to	  maintain	  social	   identity	  within	  reduced	  life	  chances.	  The	  social	  reaction	  perspective	  thus	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came	  with	  its	  own	  take	  on	  criminal	  causation,	  its	  own	  way	  of	  explaining	  why	  and	  how	   people	   get	   involved	   in	   socially	   destructive	   criminality.	   In	   this	   schema,	  however,	   criminal	   causation	   rests	   not	   on	   odious	   circumstances	   –	   poverty,	  deprivation,	   exclusion	   –	   and	   deteriorating	   social	   ethics	   but	   on	   the	   idea	   that	  deviance	   signals	   active	   construction	   of	   social	   meaning	   on	   the	   part	   of	   labelled	  individuals	   and	   provides	   criminology	   with	   a	   significant	   illustration	   of	   ‘innate	  human	   freedom’.	   In	   other	   words,	   it	   suggests	   that	   criminality	   allows	   labelled	  individuals	  to	  negotiating	  meaning	  within	  a	  society	  that	  holds	  them	  in	  contempt,	  coming	  up	  with	  all	  manner	  of	  justifications,	  explanations,	  excuses	  and	  dismissals	  (Albas	   &	   Albas,	   2003)	   that	   allow	   them	   to	   freely	   integrate	   deviance	   into	   their	  understanding	   of	   selfhood	   and	   claim	   a	   sense	   of	   identity	   from	   a	   society	   that	  excludes	  them	  from	  legitimate	  pursuits.	  The	  social	  reaction	  schema,	  drawing	  on	  symbolic	   interactionism	   and	   C.	   Wright	   Mills	   (1940)	   ‘vocabularies	   of	   motive’,	  effectively	   argues	   that	   that	   crime	   and	   deviance	   are	   artefacts	   of	   self-­‐determination,	   expressions	   of	   inalienable	   freedom,	   amid	   the	   conservative	  moralisation	   common	   to	   over-­‐bearing	   states	   and	   corporate	  media	   outlets.	   The	  key	  intimation	  of	  course	  being	  that	  the	  labelled	  individuals	  would	  have	  no	  need	  and	  possibly	  no	  reason	  to	  construct	  social	  meaning	  by	  amplifying	  their	  deviance	  if	  society	  could	  simply	  refrain	  from	  putting	  them	  in	  that	  position.	  	  	  The	   idea	   that	   crime	   and	   deviance	   are	   products	   of	   stigmatised	   individuals’	  attempts	   to	  negotiate,	  acquire	  and	  preserve	  social	  meaning	  on	  an	  ad-­‐hoc	  basis,	  however,	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  problems	  with	  the	  social	  reaction	  paradigm	   and	   late-­‐twentieth	   century	   criminological	   theory.	   When	   it	   comes	   to	  actually	  explaining	  why	  people	  get	  involved	  in	  criminality,	  social	  reaction	  relies	  on	   a	   concept	   of	  motive	   that	   excludes	   ideology	   and	   social	   ethics	   in	   favour	   of	   a	  distinctly	   individualist,	   almost	   rationalist	   interpretation	   of	   criminal	   causation.	  The	   idea	   that	  motive	   comes	  down	   to	  explanations	  and	  excuses	  offered	  by	   self-­‐positing	   subjects	   in	   light	   of	   socially	   assigned	   stigma	   concentrates	   on	   surface	  detail	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  underlying	  causes	  -­‐	  any	  form	  of	  social	  action,	  we	  might	  suggest,	  involves	  an	  immediate	  choice	  of	  whether	  to	  partake	  or	  refrain	  and	  that	  choice	  necessarily	  occurs	  within	  a	  single	  mentality	  but	  social	  reaction	  mistakes	  the	   internality	   of	   said	   choice	   for	   motivation.	   In	   other	   words,	   it	   trades	   on	   the	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everyday	   meaning	   of	   ‘motivation’	   as	   a	   proximate,	   conscious	   and	   inherently	  individual	   reason	   that	   colours	   social	   action	   in	   the	  moment	   so	  as	  not	   to	  engage	  with	   the	  more	  sociological	  possibility	  of	   subconscious	   ideological	  precepts	   that	  inform	  momentary	  decision-­‐making	  at	  a	  much	  deeper	  level,	  influencing	  the	  ideas	  and	   preconceptions	   that	   affect	   the	   way	   such	   choices	   are	   made.	   In	   this	   vein,	  Hadfield	  (1955	  quoted	  in	  Campbell,	  1996:	  102-­‐3)	  suggested	  that	  ‘motivation’	  can	  be	  interpreted	  in	  one	  of	  two	  ways	  “when…	  we	  say	  that	  the	  ‘motive	  for	  the	  crime	  was	  theft’,	  we	  mean	  that	  this	  was	  the	  ‘end	  in	  view’	  which	  moved	  the	  prisoner	  to	  commit	  the	  crime…	  it	  would	  be	  equally	  true	  to	  say	  that	  the	  motive	  for	  the	  crime	  was	   avarice…	   in	  which	   case	  we	  use	   ‘motive’	   to	  mean	   the	   instinctive	  motive	   or	  
force	  which	   impelled	  him	  to	  perform	  the	   theft”.	  What’s	  missing	   from	  the	  social	  reaction	   perspective	   is	   any	   deeper	   understanding	   of	   social	   ethics,	   the	   ideas,	  concepts	   and	   common	   philosophical	   dispositions	   which,	   in	   keeping	   with	  Hadfield’s	   example,	   might	   build	   ‘avarice’	   into	   broader	   socio-­‐cultural	   ideals	  turning	   it	   into	  an	  operant	   force	  capable	  of	   impelling	  social	  action.	   In	  taking	  the	  immediate	   offending	   choice	   for	   an	   illustration	   of	   agency	   and	   free	   will,	   social	  reaction	   theory	   sidesteps	   the	   vital	   ideological	   context	   that	   might	   bring	  criminology	   to	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   ideas,	   common	   understandings	   and	  philosophical	  precepts	  that	  made	  crime	  seem	  worthwhile.	  	  	  	  	  In	  this	  light,	  Hall	  (2012:	  109)	  suggests	  that	  social	  reaction	  theory	  has	  “nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  social	  scientific	  and	  philosophical	  investigation	  into	  why	  individuals	  are	   willing	   to	   do	   harm	   to	   others	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   self”	   leading	   to	   the	  increasingly	   forceful	   assertion	   that	   criminology’s	   portrayal	   of	   the	  deviant/criminal	   as	   wronged	   victim	   of	   overbearing	   power	   may	   well	   be	  insufficient.	   Many	   of	   our	   key	   theorists	   are	   beginning	   to	   recognise	   that	   the	  discipline’s	   allegiance	   to	   individualist	  notions	  of	   liberty	   and	  agency	  have	   left	   it	  unable	   to	   offer	   a	   perspective	   on	   the	   second	   meaning	   of	   motivation,	   on	  differential	  social	  ethics	  and	  how	  certain	  dispositions	  might	  drive	  the	  infliction	  of	  harm.	   If	  we	  return	  to	  Steve	  Hall	   (Ibid.	  94),	   for	  example,	  we	  might	  even	  suggest	  that	   “decades	   of	   liberal	   dominance,	   controlling	   research	   programmes	   and	  selecting	  and	  deselecting	  theoretical	  frameworks,	  has	  denied	  us	  any	  insight	  into	  the	   vital	   ontological	   category	   of	   the	   subject	   of	   ideology”.	   	   The	   discipline’s	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predilection	  for	  portraying	  the	  ‘deviant’	  as	  a	  free-­‐thinking	  individual	  rather	  than	  a	  subject	  of	  ideology	  has	  arguably	  prevented	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  properly	  critical	  perspective	  on	   criminal	  motivation	   including	   its	   relationship	  with	  what	  Weber	  might	   have	   called	   the	   underlying	   ‘spirit’	   of	   late	   capitalism	   (see	   Boltanski	   &	  Chiapello,	  2005;	  Campbell,	  2006)	  	  	  	  The	  great	  problem	  for	  contemporary	  criminological	  theory	  is	  that	  our	  decades-­‐long	   dalliance	  with	   social	   reaction	   seems	   to	   have	   produced	   little	   of	   any	   value	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  actually	  explaining	   the	   socio-­‐ethical	  basis	   for	   criminality	  and	  the	  cultural	  ideals	  that	  apparently	  justify	  the	  infliction	  of	  harm	  in	  the	  service	  of	  instrumental	  or	  expressive	   interests.	   Its	  underlying	   liberal	  narrative	  has	   left	  us	  struggling	   to	   explain	   persistent	   forms	   of	   criminality	   appearing	   throughout	   the	  social	   structures	   of	   late	  modern	   capitalism	   by	   placing	   undue	   emphasis	   on	   self	  determination	  and	  the	  ethical	  autonomy	  of	   the	   individual	  at	   the	  expense	  of	   the	  relationship	   between	   individuality	   and	   ideology.	   In	   Hall	   et	   al’s	   (2008:	   5)	  estimation,	  the:	  	  
early	   criminological	  work	   correlating	   crime	   rates	  with	   poverty,	   inequality	  and	  unemployment	  was	   largely	   ignored	  and	  dismissed	  as	   ‘reductionist’	   by	  both	   the	   Left	   and	   Right…	   The	   left	   were	   keen	   to	   downplay	   working-­‐class	  deviancy	  and	  focus	  on	  the	  crimes	  of	  the	  powerful,	  and	  the	  right	  were	  keen	  to	  ignore	   consumerist	   values,	   political	   economy	   and	   the	   social	   conditions	   of	  existence	  to	  press	  their	  traditional	  case	  for	  personal	  responsibility.	  	  In	   this	   context,	   however,	   the	   last	   few	   years	   have	   seen	   a	   marked	   return	   to	  theorising	   criminal	  motivation	  and	  a	  greater	  willingness	   to	   look	  beyond	  public	  discourse	   in	   favour	   of	   political	   economy	   and	   socio-­‐cultural	   explanations	   for	  criminality.	  The	   final	   section	  of	   this	   chapter	   turns	  our	   attention	   to	   these	   latest	  movements	   in	   our	   discipline’s	   immediate	   intellectual	   lineage	   as	   it	   attempts	   to	  counter	  the	  overbearing	  influence	  of	  social	  reaction	  theory	  and	  develop	  a	  more	  holistic,	  explanatory	  perspective	  on	  crime	  and	  deviance.	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When	  it	  comes	  to	  social	  reaction	  theory’s	  dominance	  of	  criminology	  there	  have	  undoubtedly	   been	   a	   number	   of	   notable	   countertrends	   including	   left	   realism’s	  ongoing	   attempts	   to	   move	   beyond	   debating	   the	   power	   to	   define	   crime	   and	  deviance	   to	   look	  at	   real	  world	   impact	   (see	  Currie,	  2010)	  as	  well	  as	  a	  small	  but	  steady	  undercurrent	  of	  political-­‐economic	  theorisation	  (see,	  for	  instance,	  James,	  1995;	  Taylor,	  1999).	  Nevertheless,	  such	  contributions	  are	  far	  outweighed	  by	  the	  sheer	  volume	  of	  social	  reaction	  theory.	  Hall	  and	  Winlow	  (2007:	  83),	  for	  example,	  observe	  that	  critical	  exploration	  of	  relationships	  between	  criminality	  and	  socio-­‐cultural	  ideals	  have	  been	  confined	  to	  “a	  dismissive	  aside	  in	  undergraduate	  texts	  or	   a	   sporadic	   volley	   launched	   from	   a	   disgruntled	   Mertonian	   or	   a	   lonely	   neo-­‐Marxist”.	  Meanwhile	   the	   largest	   part	   of	   the	   discipline	   “followed	   the	   prevailing	  trend	  in	  radical	  liberal	  philosophy	  and	  decided	  it	  was	  no	  longer	  hip	  to	  posit	  the	  capitalist	  economy	  and	  its	  relations	  of	  production	  as	  the	  bedrock	  of	  social	   life,”	  rejecting	   the	   analysis	   of	   driving	   forces	   in	   favour	   of	   public	   representation,	  criminal	  agency	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  proto-­‐political	  deviation.	  	  What’s	   missing	   from	   the	   resultant	   social	   reaction	   narrative	   is	   any	   account	   of	  criminal	   motivation	   beyond	   a	   vague,	   nameless	   and	   supposedly	   proto-­‐political	  dissatisfaction	  with	  existing	  social	  norms	  that	  contributes	  little	  to	  any	  analysis	  of	  the	   ‘spirit’	   of	   criminality.	   It	   proffers	   a	   critical	   perspective	   on	   inherently	   unjust	  social	  relations	  and	  their	  tendency	  to	  exclude,	  impoverish,	  label	  and	  confine	  but	  apparently	   chooses	   not	   to	   engage	   with	   the	   underlying	   forces	   of	   liberal	  capitalism’s	   accumulation	   imperative	   and	   the	   increasingly	   forceful	   suggestion	  that	   it	   has	   created	   a	   swath	   of	   ‘high-­‐crime	   societies’	   (Garland,	   2000;	   Hall	   &	  McLean,	  2009;	  Reiner,	  2006;	  2012)	  by	  promoting	  the	  socio-­‐ethical	  pre-­‐requisites	  of	   increased	   criminality.	   The	   discipline’s	   overarching	   subscription	   to	   late-­‐twentieth	  century	  liberalism	  foregrounded	  the	  assertion	  that	  crime	  and	  deviance	  were	  often	  problems	  of	  social	  reaction	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  these	  ideas	  took	  up	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	  research	  funding,	  caught	  the	  attention	  of	  new	  students	  and	  future	  researchers	   and	   filtered	   into	   teaching	   programmes	   as	   ‘contemporary’	  criminological	   theory	   eventually	   acquiring	   the	   status	   of	   dominant	   analytical	  paradigm.	   In	   the	   process,	   however,	   it	   also	   blocked	   analysis	   of	   the	   ideological	  forces	  –	  beliefs,	   ideals,	  common	  understandings,	  philosophies	  of	  social	   life,	  and,	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above	   all,	   social	   morality	   –	   that	   arguably	   drive	   people	   into	   criminality	   by	  providing	   the	   social-­‐psychological	   impetus	   for	   violent	   and	   acquisitive	  interactions.	  	  The	  last	  few	  years	  have	  seen	  a	  marked	  return	  to	  theorising	  crime’s	  driving	  forces	  with	   a	   number	   of	   prominent	   figures	   adopting	   a	  more	   explanatory,	  motivation-­‐centred	   approach	   that	   arguably	   points	   the	   way	   beyond	   social	   reaction	   and	  underlying	  adherence	   to	   late-­‐twentieth	  century	   individualist	   liberalism.	   It	   is	  an	  exercise	   in	   complimenting	   criminology’s	   thoroughgoing	   engagement	   with	  inequalities	   of	   representation	   by	   building	   in	   a	   greater	   awareness	   of	   the	  ideological	  forces	  that	  drive	  violent	  and	  acquisitive	  behaviours	  in	  the	  service	  of	  instrumental	  goals	  and	  self-­‐determinative	  subjectivity.	  In	  this	  vein,	  Colin	  Sumner	  (2012:	   174),	   while	   offering	   a	   critique	   of	   ongoing	   attempts	   to	   resurrect	   the	  sociology	  of	  deviance	  in	  the	  service	  of	  a	  ‘right-­‐wing	  ideology’,	  acknowledges	  that	  “there	   is	   a	   need	   for	   a	   critical	   re-­‐moralization	   of	   society”	   and	   a	   much	   deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  “influence	  of	  the	  amoral	  culture	  of	  the	  rich	  and	  powerful”.	  What’s	  being	  suggested	  is	  not	  so	  much	  the	  abandonment	  of	  censure	  –	  a	  paradigm	  that	   has	   undoubtedly	   hatched	  number	   of	   useful	   ideas	   even	  where	   it	  may	  have	  blocked	  others	  –	  as	  a	  critical	  re-­‐balancing	  of	  criminology	  to	  bring	  the	  analysis	  of	  crime’s	  ideological	  foundations	  back	  into	  our	  collective	  research	  agenda,	  to	  once	  again	   make	   it	   a	   full	   and	   vibrant	   part	   of	   the	   discipline	   instead	   of	   a	   minority	  offshoot.	   It	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   move	   beyond	   endlessly	   debating	   inequalities	   of	  representation	  by	  accepting	  the	  proliferation	  of	  harmful	  criminality	  over	  the	  last	  half	  decade	  (see	  Reiner,	  2007)	  and	  turning	  our	  attention	   to	   the	  possibility	   that	  “something	  somewhere	  is	  going	  badly	  wrong	  [which]	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  passed	  off	  as	   the	   mere	   product	   of	   a	   conspiratorial	   attempt	   to	   generate	   fear	   among	   the	  population	  with	  the	  aim	  of	   legitimising	  current	  modes	  of	  authoritarian	  control”	  (Hall	  et	  al,	  2008:	  2).	  The	  resultant	   ‘return	  to	  motivation’	  (Ibid.)	  presents	  us	  with	  a	  partial	  change	  of	  trajectory	   that	   argues	   for	   deeper	   critical	   analysis	   of	   prevailing	   social	   ideals	   in	  light	   of	   the	   unchecked	   growth	   of	   recorded	   crime	   and	   the	   consequent	  proliferation	   of	   flailing,	   vaguely	   authoritarian	   attempts	   at	   control	   (Garland,	  2001).	   It	   often	   begins	   with	   some	   acknowledgement	   of	   the	   dominance	   of	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neoliberal	   political	   economy	   since	   the	   early	   nineteen	   eighties	   (Harvey,	   2005,	  Saad-­‐Filho	   &	   Johnson,	   2005)	   and,	   more	   specifically,	   the	   impact	   of	   its	   highly	  Randian	   social	   ethics	   on	   cultural	   interaction.	   In	   short,	   ‘neoliberalism’,	   brought	  with	  it	  a	  set	  of	  social	  ideals	  that	  promoted	  a	  deeply	  attractive	  picture	  of	  virtuous	  lives	  free	  from	  the	  demands	  of	  community	  and	  social	  integration	  with	  a	  primary	  responsibility	   to	   self.	   In	   Gray’s	   (2007:	   109)	   term’s	   it	   came	   with	   a	   new	  “individualist	  ethos	  of	  personal	   responsibility”	   in	  which	  relying	  on	  pre-­‐existing	  social	   structures	   –	   family,	   occupation,	   class	   and	   so	   on	   –	   to	   provide	   a	   sense	   of	  purpose,	  fulfilment,	  security	  and	  respect	  was	  little	  more	  than	  a	  sign	  of	  advanced	  moral	   degeneracy	   wholly	   inferior	   to	   going	   our	   own	   way	   and	   negotiating	   the	  marketplace	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  become	  self-­‐made	  men	  and	  women.	  If	  we	  briefly	  dip	  into	  Randian	  philosophy,	  for	  instance,	  we	  find	  the	  repeated	  assertion	  “of	  man	  as	  a	  heroic	  being,	  with	  his	  own	  happiness	  as	  the	  moral	  purpose	  of	  his	  life,	  with	  productive	  achievement	  as	  his	  noblest	  activity”	  (Rand:	  1992:	  1170)	  –	  a	  concept	  of	  human	  value	  measured	  by	  the	  acquisition	  and	  display	  of	  wealth	  and	  power,	  by	  the	   ability	   to	   have	   the	   world	   conform	   to	   an	   individualist	   exercise	   of	   will.	   For	  those	  who	  fail	   in	   this	  primary	  ethical	  duty	   it	  offers	  only	  the	   ignominy	  of	  defeat	  and	   the	  black	  mark	  of	   relative	   incapacity	   rooted	   in	   the	  deeper	  moral	   failing	  of	  not	  having	  worked	  as	  hard	  as	  those	  who	  rose	  above	  the	  herd	  by	  their	  own	  grit	  and	  determination.	  	  This	   vaguely	   Randian	   schema	   (see	   Rand,	   1961	   for	   more	   philosophical	  discussion)	   altered	   the	   signifiers	   of	   ‘value’	   –	   that	   which	   defines	   the	   relative	  worth	  of	  individual	  life	  –	  by	  which	  we	  acquire	  and	  preserve	  a	  sense	  of	  purpose	  and	   respect	   explicitly	   rooting	   them	   in	   the	   acquisition	   and	   display	   of	   material	  commodities	  and	  enjoyable	  experiences.	  The	  ‘consumer	  society’	  (Bauman,	  2007)	  has	  tied	  our	  sense	  of	  purpose,	  achievement	  and	  ‘social	  identity’	  to	  the	  acquisition	  and	  disposal	  of	  pecuniary	   resources	   in	   such	  a	  way	   that	  we	  primarily	   construct	  meaning	   as	   desiring	   subjects	   within	   a	   system	   that	   exists	   to	   “enchant…	   with	  dreams	  (of	  freedom,	  of	  how	  your	  success	  depends	  on	  yourself,	  of	  the	  run	  of	  luck	  which	  is	  just	  around	  the	  corner,	  of	  unconstrained	  pleasures…)”	  (Žižek,	  2009:	  26).	  What	   this	  means,	   in	  practice,	   is	   that	  our	  place	  within	  society	  and	  our	  access	   to	  positive	   mental	   states	   –	   happiness,	   fulfilment	   and	   so	   on	   (Belliotti,	   2003;	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Schumaker,	  2006)	  –	  exist	  only	   to	   the	  extent	   that	  we	  engage	  with	   the	  endlessly	  saccharine	   allure	   of	   consumer	   solipsism	   as	   a	   primary	   means	   of	   self-­‐determination	  within	   a	   socio-­‐cultural	   firmament	   that	   lauds	   the	   self-­‐made,	   self-­‐reliant	  individual	  while	  denigrating	  anyone	  who	  finds	  themselves	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  pile.	  It	  is	  a	  picture	  of	  social	  interaction	  in	  which	  consumptive	  solipsism	  is	  seen	   as	   a	   morally	   praiseworthy	   mode	   of	   being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	   while	   anything	  outside	   those	   confines	   indicates	   a	   moral	   failing,	   a	   despicable	   incapacity	   that	  displays	  nothing	  less	  than	  incoherence,	  inferiority	  and	  outright	  inhumanity.	  The	  result	  is	  to	  tie	  our	  sense	  of	  selfhood	  into	  a	  Sisyphean	  labour	  that	  requires	  the	  constant	  acquisition	  of	  pecuniary	  wealth	  and	  its	  rotating	  disposal	  amongst	  a	  sea	  of	  proffered	  experiences	  and	  commodities	  each	  of	  which	  provides	  a	  momentary	  symbolic	  contribution	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  selfhood	  constituted	  amid	  the	  ever-­‐present	  threat	  of	  socio-­‐cultural	  insignificance.	  If	  we	  do	  not	  work	  hard	  enough,	  if	  we	   do	   not	   participate	   to	   our	   fullest	   in	   the	   virtuous	   round	   of	   acquisition	   and	  disposal	  then	  ours	  is	  an	  ignominious	  place	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  pile	  cut	  off	  from	  everything	   that	   communicates	   the	  Randian	  value	  of	   self-­‐identity.	  The	  assertion	  that	   this	   self-­‐determinative	   ideal	   has	   become	   one	   of	   late	  modernity’s	   primary	  ethical	   forces	   has	   been	   a	   substantial	   part	   of	   the	   sociological	   literature	   for	  decades	   (see,	   for	   instance,	   Bauman,	   2000a;	   2000b;	   Beck	   &	   Beck-­‐Gernsheim,	  2002)	  along	  with	  its	  attendant	  inversion:	  failure	  to	  self-­‐determine	  or	  otherwise	  live	  up	  to	  the	  ‘ultimate	  sustaining	  fantasy’	  of	  autonomous	  selfhood	  is	  to	  acquire	  the	   black	   mark	   of	   the	   post-­‐modern	   untermensch	   excluded	   from	   the	   virtuous	  construction	   of	   social	   identity	   through	   value-­‐laden	   acquisition	   of	   symbolic	  objects.	  In	  this	  way	  a	  ‘liberal’	  society	  nominally	  based	  on	  the	  inalienable	  freedom	  of	   the	   individual	  communicates	  both	  success	  and	   failure	  conditions,	   the	   former	  desirable	  and	   ‘virtuous,’	   the	   latter	  presenting	  us	  with	  an	  ever-­‐present	   threat	   to	  the	   future	   maintenance	   of	   social	   identity,	   turning	   it	   into	   a	   labour	   of	   constant	  anxiety	  at	  the	  fragility	  of	  carefully	  constructed	  lifestyle-­‐projects	  (Becker,	  1985).	  	  Where	   social	   reaction	   theory	   largely	   proceeded	   from	   the	   assertion	   that	   crime	  and	   deviance	   were	   constituted	   in	   opposition	   to	   these	   over-­‐arching	   cultural	  forces,	  the	  ‘return	  to	  motivation’	  takes	  a	  slightly	  different	  approach.	  It	  comes	  at	  the	  problem	  of	  crime	  in	  light	  of	  late-­‐twentieth	  century	  liberalism’s	  ascent	  to	  the	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status	   of	   dominant	   ideology	   (Hedges,	   2011)	   noting	   the	   integral	   position	   of	  success/failure	   conditions	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   impelling	   social	   action.	   In	   the	   last	  few	  decades	   criminology’s	  major	   theoretical	   assertion	  with	   regards	  motivation	  has	  been	  the	  idea	  that	  low	  level	  deviance	  is	  the	  product	  of	  individuals	  expressing	  their	   free-­‐will	  and	  drive	  to	  self-­‐determination	  amid	  a	  social	  system	  that	  sought	  to	  constrain	  them	  through	  its	  ability	  to	  label	  and	  punish.	  It	  is	  an	  assertion	  born,	  more	   often	   than	   not,	   of	   Foucault’s	   (1991)	   contention	   that	   disciplinary	  technologies	   and	   discourses	   bear	   down	   on	   helpless	   individuals,	   erode	   their	  innate	   freedom	   and	   ultimately	   create	   ‘normalised’	   subjects	   wholly	   integrated	  into	   the	   needs	   of	   a	   power-­‐elite.	   The	   ‘return	   to	   motivation’	   on	   the	   other	   hand	  starts	  with	  the	  observation	  that	  individualist	  liberalism	  has	  become	  something	  of	  a	   key	  determining	   ideology	   and,	   in	   the	  process,	   “taught	   a	   concept	   of	   humanity	  according	   to	   which	   ‘what	   is	   most	   ‘human’	   about	   people	   is…	   their	   need	   to	  incorporate	   ‘more	   and	   more’	   –	   goods,	   money,	   experience,	   everything”	   (Frank,	  1999:	  20)	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  criminology	  needs	  to	  develop	  new	  ideas	  to	  explain	  how	  these	  emergent	  cultural	  ethics	  effect	  social	  interaction.	  	  Instead	  of	  arguing	  that	  criminality	  represents	  a	  vanguard	  rejection	  of	  restrictive	  social	  norms,	   the	   ‘return	   to	  motivation’	   takes	  account	  of	  consumer	  capitalism’s	  ascent	  to	  the	  status	  of	  dominant	  ideology	  in	  order	  to	  consider	  the	  possibility	  that	  current	  social	  problems,	  including	  criminality,	  perhaps	  result	  more	  from	  a	  broad	  cultural	  allegiance	  to	  the	  ideals	  of	  late-­‐twentieth	  century	  capitalism.	  It	  proceeds	  from	   the	   observation	   that	   we	   are	   less	   constrained	   than	   constantly	   and	  unendingly	   enjoined	   to	   express	   ourselves	   through	   consumer	   markets	   (Žižek,	  1997;	  2006;	  2009)	  even	  as	  our	  increasingly	  unequal	  societies	  effectively	  exclude	  large	  sections	  of	   the	  population	   from	   legitimate	  means	  of	   identity	  construction	  (see	  Lansley,	  2006).	  What’s	  more,	  the	  resultant	  failure	  to	  live	  up	  to	  our	  primary	  ethical	   duty	   –	   the	   self-­‐determinative	   construction	   of	   consumer	   identity	   –	  contributes	   one	   of	   the	   primary	   motivating	   forces	   of	   life	   under	   late	   capitalism	  experienced	   as	   a	   radical	   and	   potentially	   transformative	   sense	   of	   anxiety,	  incompleteness	   and	   impending	   loss	   that	   looms	   over	   subjective	   experience	  inspiring	   us	   to	   greater	   heights	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   live	   up	   to	   dominant	   notions	   of	  virtuous	  action	  and	  value-­‐laden	  selfhood.	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In	   other	   words,	   western	   culture’s	   socio-­‐ethical	   emphasis	   on	   consumer	  subjectivity	  seems	  to	  have	  recalibrated	  or	  restructured	  dominant	  ethical	  norms	  in	  relation	  to	   instrumental	  and	  expressive	   interests	   that	  have	  perhaps	  changed	  “what	   is	   regarded	   as	   acceptable	   and	   unacceptable,	   proper	   and	   improper,	  legitimate	  and	   illegitimate,	  or	  praiseworthy	  and	  blameworthy	  behaviour	   in	   the	  light	   of	   the	   moral	   principles	   (e.g.	   justice…	   fairness,	   decency…	   authenticity,	  reliability)…	  changing	  the	  criteria	  by	  which	  people	  evaluate	  their	  own	  and	  each	  other’s	  actions”	  (Weigratz,	  2010:	  124).	  What	  is	  being	  suggested,	  in	  other	  words,	  is	   that	   the	   socio-­‐ethical	   ideals	   associated	   with	   the	   liberalisation	   of	   western	  society	   placed	   a	   set	   of	   pressures	   on	   individuals	   that	   have	   reconstituted	   social	  morality	  providing	  the	  impetus	  for	  self-­‐serving	  criminality.	  	  It	   is	   immediately	   apparent	   that	   there	   are	   more	   than	   a	   few	   shades	   of	   the	   old	  sociology	  of	  deviance	  in	  this	  idea	  and	  many	  of	  the	  early	  proponents	  of	  this	  return	  to	  motivation	  tend	  to	  reference	  Chicago	  School	  scholars	  with	  notable	  frequency,	  if	  only	  because	  they	  provide	  a	  disciplinary	  touchstone	  for	  what	  is	  essentially	  an	  argument	   in	   favour	  of	  political-­‐economic	  causation.	  The	   influence	  of	  Mertonian	  Strain	   theory	   (see	   also,	   Messner	   &	   Rosenfeld,	   2006),	   for	   instance,	   is	   quite	  obvious	   in	   Robert	   Reiner’s	   (2007)	   recent	   output	   as	  well	   as	   some	   of	   the	  more	  responsive	  cultural	  criminologists	  such	  as	  Keith	  Hayward	  (&	  Yar,	  2006)	  and	  Jeff	  Ferrell	   (2012:	   245,	   248)	  whose	   recent	   exploration	   of	   the	   ‘criminology	   of	   drift’	  highlights	   “the	  degree	   to	  which,	   amidst	   the	  dynamics	   that	  define	   late	   capitalist	  economies,	  both	  failure	  and	  success	  engender	  dislocation…	  [as]	  mortgage	  fraud	  and	  insider	  trading	  costs	  millions	  their	  homes	  and	  their	  livelihoods…	  others	  lose	  home,	   neighbourhood	   or	   career	   to	   the	   economic	   bulldozer	   of	   ‘consumption	  driven	  urban	  development’”.	  	  	  While	  such	  assertions	  may	  provide	  the	  opening	  refrain	  of	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  the	  sociological	   theorisation	   of	   criminality	   with	   its	   roots	   in	   the	   early	   part	   of	   the	  twentieth	   century	   rather	   than	  mid-­‐century	   symbolic	   interactionism	   it	   is	   fair	   to	  say	   that	   the	   ‘return	   to	   motivation’	   aspires	   to	   rather	   more	   than	   simply	  recapitulating	  the	  sociology	  of	  deviance	  for	  a	  late-­‐modern	  audience.	  Its	  ultimate	  purpose	   is	   to	   offer	   a	   “deeper	   exploration	   of…	   direct	   yet	   complex	   relationships	  between	  our	  core	  values	  and	  practices,	  our	  current	  conditions	  of	  existence	  and	  
 20 
the	  individual’s	  motivation	  to	  commit	  crime”	  (Hall	  et	  al,	  2008:	  5).	  With	  this	  goal	  in	  mind,	  a	  number	  of	  British	  criminologists,	  often	  influenced	  by	  Steve	  Hall	  (2012:	  245)	  and	  his	   thoroughgoing	  engagement	  with	  contemporary	  social	  philosophy,	  have	   begun	   developing	   new	   explanations	   for	   “why	   liberal-­‐capitalist	   life	  constitutes	   and	   reproduces	   throughout	   the	   social	   structure	   conspicuous	   and	  influential	   subjectivities	   that	   reject	   solidarity	   for	   a	   form	   of	   competitive	  individualism,	  one	  which	  is	  willing	  to	  risk	  harm	  to	  others	  as	   it	   furthers	   its	  own	  interests”.	  In	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  and	  highly	  complex	  body	  of	  work	  Hall	  (see	  also,	  Hall	  &	   Winlow,	   2005a;	   2005b;	   Winlow	   &	   Hall,	   2006;	   2012)	   argues	   for	   a	   renewed	  analysis	  of	  criminality	  as	  an	  integral	  feature	  of	  a	  dialectical	  process	  in	  which	  the	  populations	   of	   western	   societies	   are	   perpetually	   enjoined	   to	   equate	   positive	  mental	   states	   with	   discerning	   consumption	   while	   subject	   to	   psychosocial	  dynamics	   of	   relative	   incapacity	   resulting	   from	   the	   political-­‐economic	   reality	   of	  neoliberal	   society.	   The	   dynamic	   tension	   between	   these	   forces	   inspires	   “an	  economically	  energizing	  form	  of	  competitive	  individualism	  fuelled	  by	  a	  struggle	  for	   social	   distinction”	  which	   in	   turn	   fuels	   	   “destructive,	   competitive	  drives	   and	  desires	   and	   the	   concomitant	   expansion	   and	   sophistication	   of	   external	   and	  internal	  control	  measures	  in	  a	  relation	  of	  mutual	  amplification”	  (Hall,	  2012:	  254-­‐5).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  socially	  destructive	  criminality	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  by	  product	  of	  the	  self-­‐same	  forces	  that	  drive	  liberal	  capitalism	  and	  its	  consumer-­‐finance	  economy	  with	   just	   as	   much	   influence	   in	   criminal	   causation	   as	   everyday,	   law-­‐abiding	  consumption,	  borrowing	  and	  many	  other	  prominent	  forms	  of	  social	  interaction.	  The	   great	   problem	   with	   the	   social	   reaction	   narrative	   was	   its	   excessively	  simplistic,	   non-­‐dialectical	   theory	   of	   criminality,	   which	   uncritically	   posited	   a	  causal	   relationship	   between	   punitive	   statist	   attempts	   at	   social	   control	   and	  individual	   deviance.	  Where	   the	   dominant	   criminological	   paradigm	   of	   the	   late-­‐twentieth	   century	   saw	   crime	   as	   the	   product	   of	   proto-­‐political	   sentiments	  inspired	   by	   oppressive	   social	   norms,	   that	   of	   the	   early	   twenty-­‐first	   century	  proffers	  a	  far	  more	  satisfying	  explanation	  rooted	  in	  the	  internalisation	  of	  liberal	  ideals	   at	   the	   confluence	   of	   dynamic	   cultural	   pressures	   culminating	   in	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‘hyperconformist’	   attempts	   to	   rise	   above	   the	   herd	   and	   acquire	   the	   value-­‐laden	  symbolism	  of	  ‘consumer	  society’	  by	  means	  fair	  or	  foul.	  
	  
Conclusion	  The	  core	  thesis	  of	  Sumner’s	  obituary	  for	  the	  sociology	  of	  deviance	  made	  two	  key	  assertions	   about	   the	  philosophical	   and	   theoretical	   development	   of	   criminology	  during	  the	  latter	  decades	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  the	  first	  of	  which	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  historical	  observation	  while	   the	  second	  provides	  a	  consequent	  assessment	  of	  potential	  contribution	  to	  sociological	  understandings	  of	  crime	  and	  deviance.	  In	  the	  former	  case,	  it	  is	  probably	  fairly	  safe	  to	  say	  that	  Sumner’s	  analysis	  was	  right	  on	  the	  money.	  There	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  criminology	  did	  undergo	   something	   of	   a	   paradigm	   shift	   after	   nineteen-­‐seventy	   in	   which	   the	  discipline	   as	   a	  whole	   substantially	   de-­‐emphasised	   a	   normative,	   realist	   take	   on	  crime	   and	   deviance	   in	   favour	   of	   far	  more	   post-­‐modern,	   relativist	   emphasis	   on	  discourse,	   representation	   and	   imbalanced	   powers	   of	   definition.	   This	   new	  paradigm	   began	  with	   symbolic	   interactionism	   and	   the	   labelling	   perspective	   as	  they	  came	  out	  of	  American	  phenomenology	  but	  eventually	  played	  a	  defining	  role	  in	  much	  of	  criminology’s	  recent	  theoretical	  output	  including	  radical	  and	  critical	  criminology,	   the	   moral	   panics	   tradition	   and	   our	   discipline’s	   version	   of	   the	  ‘cultural	  turn’.	  What	  we	  collectively	  term	  ‘social	  reaction	  theory’	  or	  the	  ‘sociology	  of	   censure’	   proffered	   a	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   the	   impact	   of	   criminal	   labels	   and	  statist	  censure.	  	  Where	   we	   might	   depart	   from	   Sumner’s	   analysis,	   however,	   is	   in	   his	   second	  assertion	  and	  then	  only	  with	  the	  benefit	  of	  an	  extra	  twenty	  years	  hindsight	  into	  the	   overall	   distribution	   of	   criminological	   research.	   If	   we	   look	   back	   at	   the	  contemporary	  literature,	  despite	  a	  few	  notable	  and	  prominent	  countertrends,	  we	  can	  identify	  a	  discipline	  that	  seems	  to	  have	  collectively	  identified	  social	  reaction	  as	   a	   positive	   source	   of	   future	   development	   with	   which	   to	   extricate	   the	  sociological	   study	   of	   crime	   and	   deviance	   from	   a	   problematic	   relationship	  with	  bureaucratic	   pragmatism.	   The	   result,	   however,	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   a	  criminological	   paradigm	   that	   bought	   into	   the	   anti-­‐bureaucratic	   and	   anti-­‐
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authoritarian	   spirit	   of	   the	   late	   twentieth	   century	  with	   its	  over-­‐riding	  emphasis	  on	  liberating	  individual	  will	  from	  social	  expectation	  and	  collective	  responsibility.	  In	  the	  process,	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	  criminological	  theory	  apparently	  subscribed	  to	  an	  increasingly	  dominant,	  all	  but	  unchallenged	  ideology	  that	  recalibrated	  social,	  political	   and	   economic	   fortunes	   across	   the	  western	  world	   as	   it	   communicated	  and	   valorised	   a	   set	   of	   ideals	   that	   placed	   greater	   emphasis	   on	   the	   individual’s	  responsibility	   for	   the	   ‘virtue’	   and	   ‘value’	   of	   their	   lifestyle	   measured	   by	   the	  symbolic	  content	  of	  material	  commodities	  and	  the	  enjoyment	  we	  gain	  from	  their	  disposal.	  	  When	   the	   discipline	   subscribed	   to	   this	   paradigm	   shift,	   however,	   it	   created	   a	  block	   between	   criminological	   theorisation	   and	   the	   socio-­‐ethical	   dominance	   on	  Randian	   liberalism	   leading	  us	   to	   ignore	   increasingly	   forceful	   ideals	  because	  we	  were	   too	   busy	   imagining	   the	   liberation	   of	   the	   individual	   from	   censorious	  corporate	   media	   and	   reactionary	   authoritarian	   state.	   The	   consequence	   of	   this	  realignment	  is	  a	  discipline	  that	  certainly	  offers	  a	  fairly	  thoroughgoing	  appraisal	  of	   media	   effects	   and	   political	   discourse	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   any	   substantial	  appreciation	  of	  how	  ethical	  concepts	  influence	  social	  interaction	  and	  manifest	  in	  lived	   experience	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   might	   create	   the	   scope	   for	  transformations	   in	   human	   behaviour.	   While	   censure	   might	   have	   provided	   a	  number	   of	   very	   useful	   ideas	   and	   interpretations,	   it	   is	   distinctly	   lacking	   in	   the	  crucial	  respect	  of	  criminal	  motivation	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  discipline’s	  amassed	  output	   no	   longer	   comes	   close	   to	   answering	   some	   of	   the	   most	   fundamental	  questions	  of	  criminological	  enquiry.	  The	  dominance	  of	  censure,	  it	  seems,	  has	  led	  criminological	  theory	  into	  a	  stagnatory	  phase	  that	  is	  only	  now	  being	  rectified	  by	  growing	   research	   interest	   in	   the	   ethical	   concepts	   underlying	   an	   observed	  profusion	  of	  self-­‐serving,	  acquisitive	  and	  violent	  interactions.	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